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Abstract
Growing attention is being paid to the increasing incidence of expert and lay citizen encounters in the
processes of technological implementation. This poses the problem of the nature of participation, now a
quite common topic in the field of science and technology studies. We offer firstly a brief review of the main
issues regarding participation through deliberative participatory methods, pointing out their main strengths
and weaknesses. Then, we propose Participatory Action Research as a way of improving and strengthening
participation, especially in the field of telehealthcare. This is illustrated through an example extracted from
our research with older people and telecare devices. Finally, participation is analysed as the critical issue in
order to underpin the democratisation of research as a whole, offering the practice of cosmopolitics as a key
to achieve such an end.
© 2009 Association ALTER. Published by Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
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Résumé
L’accroissement des rencontres entre experts et citoyens profanes, au cours des processus de mise en
application de technologies, suscite une attention de plus en plus vive. Cela pose le problème de la nature
de la participation, qui est actuellement une thématique courante dans le domaine des études des sciences et
technologies. Nous proposons tout d’abord une brève revue des principales questions relatives à la participa-
tion utilisant des méthodes de délibération participative, en soulignant leurs principales forces et faiblesses.
Puis, nous envisageons la recherche-action participative comme un moyen d’améliorer et de renforcer la
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participation, en particulier dans le domaine du télésoin/de la téléassistance (telehealthcare), à partir d’un
exemple issu de notre recherche concernant les personnes âgées et les dispositifs de téléassistance (telecare).
Enfin, la participation est analysée comme un thème décisif pour soutenir la démocratisation de la recherche
dans son ensemble, proposant la pratique de la « cosmopolitique » comme une clé permettant d’atteindre un
tel but.
© 2009 Association ALTER. Publié par Elsevier Masson SAS. Tous droits réservés.
Mots clés : Telehealthcare ; Téléassistance ; Personnes âgées ; Recherche action participative ; Méthodologie ; Cos-
mopolitique
“Tell me what you exclude and I will tell you what you are”.
Michel Serres
Introduction
The introduction of technical “solutions” for all kinds of problems is becoming more and more
commonplace in everyday life, particularly in ever more complex developed societies. More often
than not, these solutions emerge without causing any kind of controversy, and are barely noticed.
The introduction of a special chip to ensure that our washing machines select the right program in
accordance with the optimum ratio between the quantity of water and the weight of the clothes,
for example, is not going to generate any kind of debate. If our car, as part of road safety plans,
starts emitting high-pitched sounds because one of the occupants has not fastened their seat belt,
there may be some kind of exchange of (possibly bad tempered) opinions with our travelling
partner, but the conversation will have probably moved onto another topic by the time we have
reached the next traffic light.
However, other solutions can prove extremely controversial. In fact, there may be some doubts
as to whether they are really solutions at all. The newspapers are reporting more and more on
controversies generated by things that started out as potential solutions for a problem but ended up
being the focus of problems of their own. Transgenic foodstuffs, initially proposed as the solution
for the lack of food, are a clear example of this.
Whether or not they are associated with debate and controversy, the interesting thing about
these cases is that when they are analysed, they almost always offer an interesting illustration
of certain characteristic dynamics of our advanced societies which relate to the constitution of
hybrid assemblages of expert and lay constituencies (Michael, 2006).
The dynamics of these hybrid assemblages are considerably varied, and studies of science and
technology made to date have provided us with good examples of their peculiarities. It is true to
say that experts often display a major tendency to ignore the local knowledge of laypeople or even
show open resistance to any form of hybridisation with them. Collins & Pinch (2002) have made
it sufficiently clear how disastrous the consequences of such disdain can be. However, we also
have clear examples in which interaction is absolutely enriching, in principle, for both parties.
As Epstein (1996) suggests, the hybridisation of experts and laypeople has been a key factor
underpinning the improvements made to the treatment of their illness by associations of carriers
of the acquired immunodeficiency virus, and has also led to interesting and fruitful considerations
of the methodology of clinical trials and possible alternatives.
In that sense, the provision of healthcare and social assistance from a distance can also be
considered as an interesting and recent arena where the relationship between experts and laypeople
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is absolutely unavoidable. Indeed, the kind of transformations encompassed in the development
of such technologies1 and its increasing generalization, especially among older people, allows us
to envisage the future proliferation of “hybrid encounters” addressed to assess the direction of
the process. In this case, participation is, and will be, the main concern of those facilitating such
experiences.
The field of science and technology studies has shown in recent years a vivid interest in the
issue of public participation. Sheila Jasanoff (2003) has coined the expression “participatory
turn” to describe such an interest. It is important to note that, in most cases, the involvement of
nonscientists, laypeople or citizens in science and technology has to do with making decisions on
science policy or with technology assessment, and very rarely implies participation at the level of
design or research practices (Lengwiler, 2008). And in the case of healthcare, the participation of
citizens so far now seems even less important. As Mort, Finch & May (2009) have noted, users
have been silent in the design and development of systems, in the production of knowledge about
their effectiveness, and in policy development about telehealthcare services.
That is, experts decide which kinds of technologies are more suitable for people who need care,
and only when problems arise with daily use, do they involve stakeholders. In such processes,
the experts’ voices prevail and mark the direction of the research and the process of evaluation
of the particular technology. However, as Webster (2002) put forward, these emerging realities
accompanying technological implementations are not “givens” but rather negotiated by users who
refuse or adopt, subvert or appropriate, and so actively and creatively engage with the promises of
new technologies all along the process. And older people are not an exception. In this sense, the
issue of care addressed to older people constitutes a field full of interesting debates: can new tech-
nologies help the development of “active ageing” policies? How can the notions of “incapacity”
and “disability” be challenged? Are public policies based on the infantilisation of ageing/older
people? And certainly, also highly critical voices against different forms of protectionism, such
as the so-called “social protection model” (which is charity based) and the “medical care model”
(which is based on the idea of diversity being an abnormality) are not absent.
In that sense, in the first part of this paper we will introduce the topic of participation in science
and technology studies. We will argue that the participatory turn is very interesting but we do this
without obviating its main weaknesses. In the second section we will try to show how to define a
step further in participation, and we will put forward Participatory-Action Research (PAR) as a
methodological tool in order to address the problems mentioned above. In the third part we will
supply some arguments to introduce action-research methodology as an excellent approach for
the study of the development and implementation of telecare devices for elderly people. Finally,
and as a conclusion, we will deal with the relationship between research and politics through a
redefinition of this last term.
Participation in science and technology studies
Over the last two decades, we have witnessed an increasing proliferation of participatory
methods mixing laypeople with experts in a kind of quest for democratization of science and
1 Just to mention some among them, it is possible to appreciate the redefinition of the home as a safe place (Milligan,
Bingley & Gatrell (2005)); the construction of the user as someone in need or a dependent person (López & Domenech,
2009); the redefinition of the role of the family, and more specifically the care function of the caregivers; the gender
implications attending the traditional gender bias in caregiving (Bettio & Plattenga, 2004); and, finally, the normativities
about what is good or bad care that arise through the implementation of these services (Finch & Mort 2005).
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technology. Consensus conferences, citizens’ juries, citizen panels or workshop scenarios are well-
known public participation methods used in technology assessment experiences or participatory
policy analysis. Compared with more traditional forms of technology assessment based only
on expert-derived knowledge, such participatory methods are considered “more democratic and
equitable, given the central role played by lay citizens” (Einsiedel & Eastlick, 2000). The same
idea is expressed in this quotation:
“Yet, why should ordinary citizens, without any specific knowledge about the technology in
question, be asked to advise politicians and society in general on such difficult and intricate
matters? One simple answer is because of democracy” (Andersen & Jaeger, 1999).
Indeed, according to such approaches, these kinds of participatory methods allow voices that
are not normally heard when debating technological issues to be drawn upon. Certainly, there
are other methods enabling people to express their opinions and points of view, such as refer-
enda, assessment of opinions through surveys or focus groups, public hearings or town meetings.
Nevertheless, these lack one fundamental characteristic of participatory approaches: deliberation
among participants. This characteristic links those participatory methods with what is known
as deliberative democracy (Hörning, 1999; Davies, 2006; Einsiedel & Eastlick, 2000; Smith &
Wales, 2000).
Broadly speaking, deliberative methods involve a quest for a small, heterogeneous sample of
citizens, without any kind of prior experience of the matter under debate; this panel or jury must
interact with “expert witnesses” on the subject, who provide them with information. According
to Hörning, there are five important similarities among deliberative public participation meth-
ods: “The event lasts several days; the participants are laypeople; the panel is heterogeneous;
experts and pressure groups are consulted; and the discussion reflects consequences and conflicts”
(Hörning, 1999).
These participatory experiences have shown that there is no need to be a member of academic
or political committees, or the member of any party or charity organisation, to be able to hold
relevant, well-informed and experience-based debates on complex political and ethical affairs,
such as the introduction of technological telecare devices into the lives of older people. In fact,
some writers (Bennett & Smith, 2007) see more advantages in citizens’ juries as a method than
in “traditional” participative research methods such as discussion groups. They argue that at the
same time that citizens’ juries incorporate lay knowledge, they also recognise the value of the
construction of knowledge, thus ensuring that the juries are supplied with a wide-range of open
arguments and perspectives. Also, the jury itself determines what has to be known, given that it has
the capacity to establish an agenda of issues and questions that require response from witnesses
and lawyers. So, what begins with the traditional division between laypeople and experts and the
initial establishment of the testimonies of the latter, ends up being transcended, given that, when
the deliberations are over, the jury has acquired expertise; jurors have had to become experts.
What makes this shift possible is the idea that all value is negotiable through deliberation, the
very essence of the political model of deliberative democracy.
Finally, such deliberative methods are supposed to produce better decisions in as much as they
are transparent and are not the product of hidden interests of lobbyists and pressure groups. It
is this which leads the general public more easily towards accepting the resulting decisions as
legitimate.
Nevertheless, critical voices have underlined some of the problems associated with deliberative
methodology. To begin with, in spite of the value given to them, decisions coming from consensus
conferences are not always taken into account by decision makers. There is usually no commitment
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from politicians to act on or implement the analysis and assessments carried out by a deliberative
forum. This has led some authors to consider that most of the time, participative methods are only
being applied as a mere mechanism for objectifying and legitimising knowledge that continues
to be obtained using standardized scientific procedures. In this vein, associations and social
movements have denounced those mechanisms as tools of opinion manipulation. They consider
that anonymous citizens who may not necessarily be interested in the problem at stake are not
a substitute for those who are better placed to represent the public. And this means that the
relationship between such mobilisations or social and collective action, and dialogic mechanisms
is neither direct nor easy (Joly & Marris, 2003).
Certainly, representation is another polemic issue regarding participative methodology:
“. . .fourteen (people) drawn from the electoral register are unlikely to determine the UK’s
genetics and insurance future” (Bennett & Smith, 2007).
Given the question of representation and how to evaluate the non-expert knowledge which must
be brought together with that of specialists (Callon, 1999; Barry, 2000; Elam & Bertilsson, 2003),
there have tended to be two approaches. First, was to try to use the epistemic complementarity
between lay and expert knowledge. This brought a re-traditionalisation and exoticisation of lay
knowledge, considered as the “other” knowledge, and had the effect of raising even more barriers
and epistemic divisions between them (de Sousa, Meneses & Nunes, 2007). Second, there has
been a tendency towards proposals in which lay groups have found their legitimacy as subjects
of dialogue has only been recognised after they have demonstrated (often with difficulty, as
they are faced by intense forces of pressure) their value and capacity for contributing to science
(Rabeharisoa & Callon, 2002; Callon, 2005). This capacity is only ratified by the actual scientific
institutions in exchange for major acculturation of lay actors through learning to competently
handle the expert terms and techniques. Therefore, in order for “non-specialist” citizens to be
included in dialogue, they must first become “expert” and specialist citizens (on the experts’
terms).
The very process of deliberation has also received some criticisms:
“However, the specific basis around which consensus is achieved, or not, in different delib-
erative processes is rarely explicit: a lack of transparency is common. Thus, while the
expectation of collaboration and openness to others that deliberation encourages are impor-
tant (Barnett, 2004), here, too, there are empirical questions about the way deliberative
methodologies enact particular understandings of identity, agency and expertise” (Davies,
2006).
Criticisms such as those expressed above lead us to consider that the claimed democratisation
of science might not be affecting its nucleus of action, but instead those agents that form part of
its “circulatory system” (Latour, 1999) and those that depend on its maintenance as the dominant
epistemic model. In this sense, the expansion of participation to other, different or even potentially
dissident epistemic groups entails a successful exercise of recruiting and “translation” that allows
for the transfer and strengthening of scientific enterprise and interests.
Uncovering the strengths and weaknesses of deliberative methods is not necessarily problem-
atic; on the contrary this signifies an interesting step in the development and understanding of
research methods. In addition, we believe that another step forward is possible, which has to do
with the use of deliberative methods in the context of PAR, which involves enacting participation
at the level of the very research process. In Kashefi and Mort’s words, this means developing
“grounded” consultation, which implies that the problem or question for debate is framed and
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developed collaboratively with those who normally are taken as subjects of investigation (Kashefi
& Mort, 2004). PAR could certainly be a tool for solving the problems of adjustment between
participation and social mobilisations mentioned above.
A further step in participation: Participatory-Action Research
Ever since its origins, PAR has been an epistemological (but also political) proposal in response
to a crisis that affected the social sciences in the 1950s and 1960s. The realisation that these aca-
demic disciplines had not helped to substantially improve human welfare; the need to generate
transformational and relevant knowledge in social terms; the impossibility of neutrality and trans-
parency in knowledge construction and the effects of domination emanating from the supposed
supremacy of more experimentalist scientism, led to the consideration of the need for researchers
to show commitment to social transformation and to denounce or intervene against situations of
social injustice. As a result, in the 1960s and 1970s, PAR emerged as a participant methodol-
ogy in which the people affected took part in solving their own problems and related subject to
subject with the researchers on the basis of critical and democratic dialogue in which they reflex-
ively sought to transform their most immediate realities. In this framing, research and action,
therefore, are inseparable. Moreover, to carry out such processes, the people or groups under
research/intervention must take part in all stages of the research-action, from the initial appraisal
of the problem to the final intervention, so that the pertinent needs and solutions are not things
that have been defined beforehand or by bodies external to the group itself.
Focusing on the work proposed by Villasante (1993), developed in a more modern European
context, and unlike the militant sociology proposed by Fals Borda (1981), PAR takes as its basis and
central agents of its process, the social networks implied in the matter of controversy in question.
To do this, it is essential for there to be ethnographic work that describes this network of actors
and the relationships between the groups with which it will be working later. The researchers,
referring to their theoretical and experiential baggage, will propose possible ways of approaching
the research work and at a broad meeting of local agents, promoters, groups and associations
and will work together to design the schedule for research and action. This schedule is made
up of a self-diagnosis in which, through the collection of data and discursive interpretations of
it, an investigation is made using (local) historical analysis to find out what networks of agents
are involved. After this, the schedule is negotiated with the groups and associations identified
on the network map, and joint plans of action are made that will be developed, published and
evaluated jointly. The central proposal of this method of approaching PAR is based on promoting
relationships between the groups and agents involved in the matter being debated in order to
provoke dynamics and synergies that multiply the creative opportunities of the social relationships.
The role of professionalism, in this case, will be that of external mirrors in which the participants
will be enabled to reflect upon their own practices and needs in the pursuit of a desirable social
change as previously defined together.
Action Research can therefore be understood to be an approach to research, whose basic
principles consider the shortcomings in terms of participation of more conventional research
methods. In this sense, we agree with the evaluation made by Bond and Corner of this method of
approaching reality:
“[Action Research] is different from traditional approaches because of the way that research
is done with people rather than on them. Contemporary action research will use a range
of methods but more often uses qualitative than quantitative methods, sharing many of the
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epistemological assumptions of qualitative researchers, particularly the importance of taking
the perspective of the other. The contribution of action research to knowledge, however,
is different from other styles of research. Whereas traditional quantitative and qualitative
approaches attempt to provide description, explanation and prediction, action research is a
process which facilitates social change” (Bond & Corner, 2001).
Of course, there are some dangers to avoid. Although the use of PAR may increase the space
for the control of knowledge (and knowledge generation) by the participants, it can also validate
dominant points of view that are crystallised as “common sense” in local monolithic knowledge,
especially when the ultimate objective of the PAR is to formulate a consensus (Goebel, 1998).
Sometimes, the discourse of participation in PAR has also served to legitimise actions decided
beforehand from institutional centres of authority and not from the interests of the people affected,
thus using it as a powerful and perverse tool for social normalisation and adaptation. This is
especially the case if researchers employ a discourse that “makes the object believe it is the
subject” (Jiménez, 1994) and when the PAR is used in a technical and professional (managerialist)
way to the extent that it becomes separated from its political potential. Moreover, the maintenance
of the difference between expert-scientific and lay-popular knowledge tends to reify the privileges
of the former over the latter (Ibán˜ez, 1996), especially when there is a tendency to consider expert
knowledge to be technical knowledge (in this case, also knowledge “about” technology) to the
detriment of that of an experiential nature, which is what tends to characterise older people’s
use of new care technologies. Again, where the initial research proposal emanates from formal
types of agents, such as universities, political institutions and public bodies, and not from already
existing social action spaces (sometimes self-organised and actively implied in the controversy
surrounding the phenomenon), this can limit the access to those agents and groups of an informal
and ad hoc nature that may be hard to identify using traditional instruments of sociological
diagnosis.
In the following section, we will illustrate the effect that PAR could have in telecare through
our exploration of its usability.
Towards an action-research methodology on the development and implementation of
telecare devices for elderly people
In the past two decades, the development of distance care (the provision of healthcare and social
assistance from a distance) and domotics (the science of electronic technologies at home) has
experienced a sharp rise all over Europe. Care devices based on information and communication
technologies (ICTs) include visual and auditory contacts and relationships between caregivers and
users in real time, clothing and household furnishings that monitor the patient inside and outside
their home, electronic bracelets for persons who are suffering from dementia and biotechnological
innovations to constantly monitor illnesses such as diabetes.
In general, telecare services feature a set of diverse and heterogeneous entities, amongst which
we can distinguish four relevant elements. First: the person being cared for; for that person, telecare
is presented as a solution for isolation, the prevention of possible risks, self-management of one’s
health and the promotion, therefore, of healthier lifestyles. It personalises and individualises
support. Second: relatives and carers; for these, telecare is a system of support that frees the carer
from certain tasks and responsibilities and can improve the care offered. Third: the community,
for whom telecare provides a care and security network. Finally: the state and institutions; in their
view, telecare rationalises and improves the management of resources; it establishes scenarios
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in which social and health aspects can be integrated. Therefore, telecare should be considered
something more than “mere technology”, for when it is implemented it enables the formation of a
network involving everything from the immediately affected person to the institutions responsible
for that person’s care.
Care technologies are generally used by people who have been considered to be vulnerable
and in need of support. Clearly, these are extremely variable and abstract categories in which we
can find anything from a woman suffering domestic violence to a middle-aged man with a chronic
heart condition. Therefore, the care technologies must address the particular specificities of the
users’ needs, while at the same time enabling them to live independently and safely. This is why
the development of e-health and e-care services has been encouraged by the EU governments, at
the same time that issues of usability have turned into an important matter of concern among the
developers of these kinds of services. Usability is so important because telecare’s aim is to provide
safety to vulnerable people while preserving their autonomy, but always in a very customisable
way. The importance of usability has lead telecare developers, for instance, to study the capacities
and specific needs of potential users in order to build devices and systems that are best adapted
to these. The main goal is to produce a technology which functions as a natural extension of the
user’s own capacity.
We, as researchers, ran into the problem of usability in the context of an ethnographic study
in the Catalan Red Cross (Creu Roja a Catalunya) Telecare Service in Barcelona from 2004 to
2006. The development of care technologies carried out by the Red Cross is clearly user-centred.
For instance, if we focus on the elderly users of the telecare service, we see that they are designed
for people who often have psychomotor problems, whose dexterity as well as their hand-eye
coordination might be weak, who might have trouble hearing, and whose working memory has
probably been decreasing over the years. For these people, putting recently learned habits and
routines into action normally takes much more effort, especially in stressful moments. All of
these aspects have been included in the brand new generation of telecare devices addressed to
older people. Thus, the telecare terminal installed in the user’s home, instead of looking like a
modern land-line telephone equipped with tiny buttons has just a simple and friendly interface
with one big red button for the alarm, a green one next to it for mobility checks, and a yellow
one for use as a phone. With this new interface, the buttons are simple to identify and easy to
press—it is not necessary to memorise long sequences of actions because most of them have been
automated.
However, in our ethnography we grasped a serious problem. People who engage in Red Cross
telecare do not always use one of the most important technical artefacts: the alarm pendant.
This device should be hung round the neck to connect users with the remote terminal mentioned
above, but many users consider that they don’t need to wear it all the time. Obviously a pendant
not attached to the body is quite useless. By focusing on this problem we would like to suggest
that we are facing a more complex process than that of adjusting the technology to the user’s
needs. In other words, we should go beyond the individual user and take into account the social
relationships in which the user is embedded. So, our case shows we are dealing with a process
in which different definitions of the technology and of the user are at stake. Through a simple
gesture such as wearing the pendant we can see how different conceptions of the pendant and the
user are enacted by different actions. To give some examples, the pendant could be a very specific
and circumstantial aid for an autonomous but cautious user; it could be a technology for disabled
people, which means, according to the user, that wearing the pendant means she is disabled or the
pendant could be something totally useless for a resigned user who knows that it is impossible to
foresee what is only known by God.
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In this way, the usability of this technology not only has to do with an adjustment between
the user’s psychological and physical characteristics and the design of the device, but mainly
with a process in which this device is reconstructed as something meaningful by the users and
other involved agents like relatives, caregivers, volunteers or operators. If we analyse this process
as a technology assessment problem we lose those dimensions of the user-technology relation.
However, if we were able to develop a participatory research approach, we would be able to make
those dimensions visible.
In this sense, we think that an action-research methodology, in which the actors – from operators
and volunteers to relatives, caregivers and users – are joined as participant-researchers, might
be a way of studying telecare technologies’ usability and solve problems which appear after
implementation. There are two main reasons. First, because usability not only depends on the
adjustment between the object and the characteristics and necessities of the user, but mainly on
how those different actors define the object, and the other way around. Thus, the more shared and
complementary the definition of the object and the actors, the more consistent and clear its use
would be. If the pendant, for instance, is seen by the users as an alarm for health problems and, by
the managers, as an aid for any kind of incident that might happen indoors, by the relatives as a
way to get rid of some care chores and by the operators as a way to work with the family and other
agents to find a solution for an incident, the mode of using this object will vary considerably, and
consequently, its usability would be quite variable. So, it seems valuable to study these different
definitions of telecare technologies and analyse the uses they enact.
The second reason is that to split research and intervention apart in this case is highly prob-
lematic, even futile, since the process of engaging the users, relatives, caregivers, operators,
volunteers and technicians in a study concerning how they define a specific technology and how it
gets embedded in their daily life, might be a way to negotiate those different definitions and look
for new ones, perhaps much more common and productive. Actually, if we think that a specific
device like the pendant becomes useful not only because the design itself fits the user’s require-
ments, but because the user, the family and the other actors’ interactions with the object might
have changed in certain ways, then to study this process is simultaneously to take part in it. For
instance, once we became aware of the problems that arise because of the different conceptions
of the service between some users and some operators and volunteers—such as a hotline for the
user to call when they just need to talk, and an alarm for severe health emergencies—we realised
that the focus group discussion from which we gathered this information could turn into a space
for discussing and negotiating those different conceptions.
In addition, we think that action-research methodology could be a very useful tool in studying
the development and implementation of care technologies because their use mainly depends on
the existence of a dense and reliable social network (even though the lack thereof is the reason that
the users or relatives hired the service) and because in some usability approaches the relationship
between the objects and the user is taken out of context. Actually, the service depends on the
context in order to function properly. In other words, the alarm pendant should work as a link,
a means to connect the user with a social network. So the more dense and reliable this network,
the more usable the pendant will be. Therefore, we think that the study of the appropriation of
the technology by the user’s social network might become a means to make it stronger and more
reliable, since we could attend to and take care of the changes the technology might produce in
the social network.
We argue then, that the study of the development and implementation of care technologies must
not focus just on users’ necessities, but it must also encompass the appropriation or domestication
process in which the meanings given to them by the different actors as well as the changes in
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their social relationships are also counted as important. Participatory action-research methodology
appears as a specially useful approach to involve all these actors and, at the same time, to make
the user’s social network stronger and more reliable.
Final remarks
We said above that participation in scientific and technological debates was a democratic
necessity. We want to go back to this idea because it poses the political dimension of research,
something that has been underlying our discussion throughout. Much has been said about the
relationship between science and politics. Now that the old idea of the caesura between them has
been overcome by the last two decades of science and technology studies, it’s time to define how
politics relates to the way we understand science. And debates around participation are, probably,
the best way to do this, given that it constitutes the basic problem for both of them. In this sense,
we want to argue that improving participation is, at the same time, a way of enhancing research
and renewing democracy. Or, as Isabelle Stengers(1997a) explains:
“I therefore maintain that what we call rationality and also what we call democracy pro-
gresses every time that there is a collective gathering of citizens who have so far been
deemed unable to assert their own interests, or are ‘bearers’ of interests that have been
deemed unworthy of consideration” (Stengers, 1997a).
This actually means a redefinition of the way we understand politics. What does this redefinition
of politics entail? Stengers has coined a phrase that is presently all the rage in studies of science
and technology: cosmopolitics. Over the course of different texts (Stengers, 1997a, 1997b, 2000,
2005), this author has presented the main features of what she understands cosmopolitics to be,
as well as its main differences from the more classical concept of politics. We shall now look at
some of the aspects that we consider to be the most interesting.
First, we should highlight the polemic nature of cosmopolitics. Whilst the classical concep-
tion of politics consists of the agreement to delimit the common world and public shared life,
cosmopolitics is considered incapable of reaching an agreement about what a “good” definition
of a common world would be (Stengers, 2005). And this, even though it may seem paradoxical
if we consider the usual and ordinary uses of the term “cosmos”, is precisely what is expressed
by the use of this term. In effect, the “cosmos” in cosmopolitics has nothing to do with any
common and universal reference, as an objective background against which the typically sub-
jective human discussions involved in politics can be compared. Rather than a meeting point,
the cosmos of cosmopolitics is a place for doubts, for indeterminacy, a place where discussion
is required before there can be consensus, controversy ahead of agreement (Stengers, 1997b).
This is especially relevant, given the appeal to nature (or in our case technology), as something
supposed to be stable and neutral, and which has meant the cancellation of politics in conven-
tional debates. When nature (or technology) speaks, there is no going back. So the depoliticising
effect that is so common as a result of interventions by experts, who are frequently spokespeople
for the same, should come as no surprise. However, what cosmopolitics precisely does is insist
upon the possibility of continuing to do politics after these interventions, so as not to stifle the
voice of those citizens (or in particular, older people) who were, until then, adjudged to be inca-
pable of presenting any opinions of sufficient value to compete with those made by the edicts of
science:
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“I suggest first distinguishing the figure of the expert and that of the diplomat. Experts are
the ones whose practice is not threatened by the issue under discussion since what they
know is accepted as relevant. Their role will require them to present themselves and to
present what they know, in a mode that does not foresee the way in which that knowledge
will be taken into account. By contrast, diplomats are there to provide a voice for those
whose practice, whose mode of existence and whose identity is threatened by a decision. ‘If
you decide that, you’ll destroy us’. The role of diplomats is therefore above all to remove
the anaesthesia produced by the reference to progress or the general interest, to give a voice
to those who define themselves as threatened, in a way likely to cause the experts to have
second thoughts and to force them to think about the possibility that their favourite course
of action may be an act of war” (Stengers, 2005).
So, the addition of the cosmos to politics questions this hackneyed design of the political
scenario based on the fiction that the few, the supposed citizens of good, decide in the name
of general interest. This reduces politics to an exercise carried out by professionals and reduces
the participation of the general public in the management of the common world to increasingly
more meaningless actions that are increasingly more restricted to a single “political” practice:
exercising one’s right to vote in elections at particular intervals. In fact, the conjunction of the
cosmos and politics as parts of the same word should, have a dual protective effect:
“While the cosmos, meaning a ‘cosmic order’, can protect us from an ‘entrepreneurial’
version of politics, giving voice only to the clearly-defined interests that have the means to
mutually counterbalance against one another, we now see that politics can protect us from a
misanthropic cosmos, one that directly communicates with an ‘honest’ or ‘sane’ reality, as
opposed to artifices, hesitations, divergences, excessiveness, conflicts, all associated with
human disorders” (Stengers, 2005).
In this sense, the cosmos in cosmopolitics is a mode of “making equal”, which does not mean
“making equivalent”, given that equivalence implies a common measure and, therefore, the possi-
bility of discerning what is better depending on a single level. When this is the case and everything
is reduced to a single level or criteria, the voice of experts used to be seen as incontestable. When
experts are consulted they like to work only on the basis of objective data obtained using high-
protocol procedures, which allow them to impose their own criteria without establishing any kind
of dialogue with the citizens concerned. For Stengers, this should be considered democratically
insufficient:
“Within a society that is a little more democratic than ours, the specialists would know (...)
that when they are called to work on a problem whose interest is not scientific but social,
the first question is: where are my co-specialists? (...) They would also know that these
co-specialists will not be able to report all the evidence, all the ‘objective’ demonstrations,
because not all problems can be articulated and presented in such a way that allows proof.
And they would know, above all, that it is not a question of establishing hierarchies of
knowledge but rather of them complicating one another. The issue at stake here is not that
of helping science to ‘progress’, but instead of being equal to the demands of a problem
facing society” (Stengers, 1997a).
Making equal, therefore, means bringing together on the same level opinions and points of view
that are usually separated into different arenas of debate, precisely because they are considered
incommensurable. Making opinions equal is, then, the best recommendation we can follow when
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gathering experts and lay citizens in the same forum. To do so, we cannot allow the desire to
reach a consensus and to constitute a common world block these processes of dialogue and
articulation between different knowledge communities. If that were to happen, projects with such
massive potential as PAR and deliberative methods would end up succumbing to the paradox of
the “imperative-democratic” active citizenship. Indeed that would be very similar to the models
of participative democracy in which citizen debate is promoted as long as this is done within a
range of undebatable, established and legitimate guidelines set by institutional authorities. On the
contrary, the type of epistemic production we are suggesting is directly connected to the proposal
for radical democracy made by Mouffe (1999, 2000) or for cosmopolitics made by Stengers
(1997a, 1997b) in that they consider dissent and conflict to be guarantors and engines for politics
and democratic practice. If that were not the case, we would be running the risk of turning the
public sphere into a technocracy that is participative in appearance but that is subjected to the
technoscientific monopoly of knowledge.
That means that as researchers we should pay attention to the heterogeneity of positions and
comprehensions around technology that live together in everyday life. As Spink (1999) says, this
task consists more of giving “ears” to those who cannot listen than of giving “voice” to those who
cannot speak. Older people, disabled people, and all kinds of marginalised groups CAN speak.
We know this because, for example, citizens and specifically older people are already talking and
expressing views about a controversial subject such as telecare when they reject or accept the use
of a technological device like the pendant. The research process we propose here obliges us to
put our own position at risk by hearing and opening up to dissent and conflict. This is important
because democratic politics, knowledge production, and even objectivity for some post-structural
positions (Haraway, 1995), only emerge from the meeting of, and articulation between a wide
range of differences, particular knowledge and experiences.
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